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Summary findings
Cote d'lvoire has historically taxed cocoa producers.  Mclntire  and Varangis find that  the benefits  tram  rhe
Market reforms over the past 10 years have somewhat  new reform (in terms of lower implicit taxes, lower
succeeded in making domestic and foreign marketing  marketing costs and margins, and higher producer piccs':
more transparent  and competitive. But they have not  will outweigh the costs from etiminating public forv-ward
done much to raise producer prices in real terms or as a  sales and fixed producer prices.
share of the FOB (free on board) price. Mvaintaining  Results from a general equilibrium zmodel  mdksate tha.
fixed producer prices and marketing costs and margins  reducing export taxes would have a smnall  negarive effec
nas encouraged rent-seeking and led to efficiency losses.  on aggregate income but would improve income
New reforms will fully liberalize the country's export  distribution for poorer rural areas.
marketing system.  by eliminating public management of  The fact that C6te d'Ivoire has market power ill Me
exports. This means the end of mandatory export  world cocoa market justifies a higher optimal export t
authorization,  of public forward sales, and of fixed  than the current one. But raising export taxes mnay
minimum producer prices and marketing margins.  eventually reduce its market share and worseni  income
The new reform is expected to improve producers'  distribution, at the expense of the poorer rural sector.
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Introduction
Cote d'Ivoire is the largest cocoa producer with a share of world production that
grew from 23 percent in 1980 to 40 percent by 1997  and 1998. Since the record
harvest of 1995/96, cocoa has usually contributed  some 35 to 40 percent of exports,
14 percent of GDP, and more than 20 percent of government income'. Production
increases during the late 1980s and 1990s  were mainly due to high producer prices in
the 1980s, land availability for new plantings in the west of the country, elastic labor
supply from poorer neighboring  countries, and special government incentives.  The
plantings that matured in the 1990s are projected to sustain production increases, and
Ivorian market share, for the foreseeable  future (ICCO 1998).
The Ivorian system has some flaws despite its recent successes to raise production
and exports. An insistence on maintaining high producer prices against declining
world prices in the late 1980s  bankrupted the cocoa marketing system. In 1990,  the
government  was forced to halve the producer  price and it is still repaying debts to the
private sector incurred in the late 1980s. Producer prices benefited little from the 100
percent devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994 and the real dollar price of cocoa in
1997/98 crop season is less than the real dollar price of 1993/94, the last season before
the devaluation. Government  polices fix marketing  costs and restrict competition,
increasing intermediation  costs and leaving a low percentage  of the FOB price to
farmers. The government's stabilization  fund has accumulated  large surpluses  in years
of relatively high world prices and these surpluses  are not rebated to producers,
thereby further reducing the producers' share of income from the crop.
The state has tried several reforms in the past decade. It sought to reduce its role in
domestic and external marketing,  to create a competitive environment  for private
agents, and to improve farmgate  prices. Those reforms have failed to achieve a major
objective however -- to increase producers' incomes in line with the FOB values of
the crop.
This paper analyzes the key aspects of the Ivorian cocoa marketing and pricing
system and evaluates new reform proposals. Section 1 analyzes the producer price
policy focusing on the marketing  cost structure and the level of producer  prices.
Section 2 examines the export sales focusing on the costs and benefits of publicly
managed forward sales. Furthermore,  this section analyzes the trade-off between
fixed and variable  producer prices. Section 3 evaluates the impact of lower export
taxes and lower marketing  costs and margins using a general equilibrium  model of the
Ivorian  economy. Finally section 4 summarizes  and concludes.
In this paper we refer to "season" in the sense of the October through September marketing season; and to "year"
as calendar year.2
I. Producer Price Policy
Private agents market and export cocoa within an administered price and cost
structure. A public company (the Caisse de Stabilisation et de Soutien des Prix des
Productions  Agricoles, known as CAISTAB),  regulates the structure with the goal of
stabilizing prices so as to reduce income risks to market participants and to allow
Cote d'Ivoire  the benefits of forward sales  2. CAISTAB controls the marketing chain
from the point of purchase from farmers through export, including that of processed
products such as cocoa liquor, butter and cake. It exercises its authority through an
official cost schedule (bareme 3), which sets prices and margins for domestic
marketing,  and for export or sale to domestic processors.  CAISTAB, in sum,
determines  profits and incomes in the Ivorian cocoa economy.
CAISTAB promulgates the bareme at the beginning of each season. Table 1
shows the bareme for 1997-98.  The bareme starts with CAISTAB's assessment of the
reference CIF price for the coming season, and works backward to the farm gate price.
The reference  CIF price is the weighted average of the price obtained in forward sales
that cover 60-70 percent of exports and the projected spot price during the current
season for the remaining 30-40 percent. The reference  CIF price is:
(I)P,IF = ap/i, + (a - l)p,
where PCIF  is the reference  CIF price for season t, a is the share of forward sales,
Pt-, is the forward price for the crop season t negotiated during the previous season t-
1, and pt  is the projected  price for remaining  (1 - a) spot sales during season t.
Following the estimation of the reference  CIF price, CAISTAB deducts estimated
maritime freight and insurance costs to arrive at an FOB price, which is guaranteed  to
exporters. Costs in the domestic marketing  chain are then deducted from the
guaranteed  FOB price, based on "reasonable'!  costs and returns for each agent
involved in domestic production and marketing  -- exporters,  processors, traders,
transporters, and farmers.
2 The direct predecessor of the current CAISTAB was created in 1962 when separate stabilization  funds for coffee
and cocoa, established in 1955, were merged. The current state company bearing the  name Caisse de
Stabilisation et de Soutien des Prix des Productions  Agricoles was created in 1964  (Kouassi Atse, 1997).
3 We use the French words for this and other expressions  used comrnmonly  in the local trade.3
The bareme further deducts  the explicit specific export tax (known as the droit
unique  de sortie, or D US) and CAISTAB's operating  costs, including its substantial
debt service, from the FOB price. The residual element in the calculation  is then the
producer price, which is set to satisfy the condition
(2)  PCIF  -maritime transport -DUS -direct domestic marketing  costs
- CAISTAB  operations -Pp = S
where Pp is the producer price and S is the stabilization  margin. In theory Pp is set so
that S is zero.
Table 1. Official cocoa export costs (bareme) in 1997/98
CFAF / kg  Percent of
FOB
CIF price (  Pc1 )  904  109
- maritime transport  costs  75  9
=  FOB price  829  100
-Export tax (DUS)  150  18
- Direct domestic marketing costs  115  14
- CAISTAB operations  49  6
- Producer price ( Pp )  455  55
=  Stabilization  margin (S)  61  7
Source:  CAISTAB.
The historical objectives of price policy have been to keep producer prices stable
and remunerative.  Between 1980 and 1989,  the stability objective was met in nominal
terms by holding guaranteed  nominal producer  prices constant across seasons. The
official producer price was set at 300 F/kg from 1980 through 1983, rose to 350 in
1984, to 375 in 1985, and was held at 400 from 1986 through 19894.
The goal of inter-annual price stabilization  was abandoned in 1990 after the
extended decline of world prices had made it impossible to maintain the producer
price across seasons 5. This is consistent with the argument of Deaton (1992) that
inter-annual  stabilization is difficult because slumps tend to last longer than booms; in
such an asymmetrical  market, even large stabilization  funds go bust. Large funds also
imply significant opportunity  costs in other public investments as they must be held in
4 Similar patterns were followed with coffee (Landell Mills 1996).
Ruf (1996) discusses the cylical nature of the world cocoa market.4
liquid form. Moreover, as we show below, price stabilization  has proven expensive  to
farmers.
Even if nominal price stabilization  limited price volatility to producers it became
fiscally unsustainable after the mid-  1980s.  The objective of producer price
stabilization  then changed from inter-annual  stabilization  to intra-annual stabilization
(within seasons). Since 1990, Cote d'Ivoire has not attempted inter-annual  price
stabilization  and it is unlikely that it will try to do so again.
The objective of remunerative producer  prices has not been well met. Figure 1
compares Ivorian  producer prices to world prices in real terms; the latter are
represented by the International  Cocoa Organization  (ICCO)  price converted to FOB
Cote d'Ivoire.  Following the collapse in 1990 from CFAF 400 to CFAF 200 per kg,
producer  prices remained low as a share of FOB. Though nominal prices rose after the
1994 devaluation and the (unrelated)  recovery  of world prices that began in 1993,
nonetheless,  real producer prices during the 1990s  have been less than one-half of
their 1980 levels. The difference  between producer and FOB prices was enormous
before 1987, became negative  in 1988 and 1989, and has widened again since 1993.
Figure  1. Cote d'Ivoire  -- Quarterly  cocoa prices  (1990 US $/mt)
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Source:  Authors'calculations  from World Bank (1998).
As a share of FOB, producer  prices in Cote d'Ivoire have been low compared to
those in other major producing countries. Data from 1995 (Figure 2) show that the
share of the producer  price in Cote d'Ivoire was smaller than any other major grower,
with the exception of Ghana. Similar comparisons  for 1997 showed that the producer
share of the FOB price in Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana remained between 48-50 percent,
while producer shares of the FOB price in other major cocoa producing countries such
as Brazil, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Indonesia, Malaysia  and Nigeria were
between 82-92 percent.5
Figure 2. Ratio of cocoa  producer price to FOB price
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Source: Schreiber and Varangis (1995).
Hanak-Freud  and Freud (1996) argue that producer prices are low in Cote d'Ivoire
because of high export taxes.  This is only partly true, however,  as producer prices are
still below those in other countries even when export taxes are considered.  During the
six seasons from 1993/94 through 1997/98, the explicit export tax (the DUS)  in Cote
d'Ivoire  was approximately  22 percent of the FOB price and the average share of
producer price to the FOB price was 49 percent, yielding a total of tax plus producer
share to the FOB price  of 71 percent.  This is below producer price shares of the FOB
price in other producing  countries with the exception  of Ghana.
Another  feature of the bareme,  which we cannot quantify precisely, clearly
discriminates  against farmers. The bareme  pays exporters for shipping costs
(insurance and freight; I&F) that exceed market rates. Given that the CIF price is
competitively  determined  on world markets, the higher I&F costs thus artificially
lower the FOB price which is used to determine  producer prices.  Based on discussions
with shippers and on comparisons  with market freight rates, CAISTAB's  bareme
calculations  of freight and handling costs are well above those actually paid by
shippers.
II. Are Forward Sales  Valuable?
Forward  sales of cocoa are a linchpin of the Ivorian  system in that they permit
CAISTAB to fix incomes of producers  and other agents. There are two key
advantages  claimed  for forward sales: a) a risk benefit in that forward  sales allow the
government  to offer a fixed annual price to farmers and hence to reduce risks to the
latter; and b) an income benefit in that they improve total export revenues because6
forward prices for cocoa tend to be higher than spot prices 6. We evaluate first the risk
benefit to producers and then the income benefit to the economy as a whole.
The Ivorian  forward sales mechanism
Cote d'Ivoire sells much of its expected crop forward through a method known by
the French acronym  P VAM  (Programme  de Ventes 4nticipies a la Moyenne). The
PVAM is designed to spread forward sales evenly throughout  the season in order to
achieve an average CIF price; in theory it does not attempt to achieve a higher than
average CIF price (i.e., to "beat the market"). CAISTAB  manages the PVAM on
behalf of the Ivorian government as follows:
CAISTAB decides the quantities of export rights (known as deblocages)  to
sell for a given contract execution date, for example,  October-December;
CAISTAB auctions the d6blocages  through an electronic trading system in
Abidjan  to firms holding valid export licenses 7;
The purchase of the deblocage amounts  to an FOB price guarantee to the
exporter;
Once exporters have bought deblocages in the auctions, they are assumed
to sell a corresponding  export contract  in New York or London in order to
hedge their sale price risk;
If the actual sale price at which the contract is executed  exceeds the
guaranteed  FOB price, the exporter repays the difference (called a
reversement) to the CAISTAB;  and
If the actual sale price at which the contract is executed is less than the
guaranteed  FOB price, the exporter receives the difference (called a soutien)
from the CAISTAB.
A positive reversement  implies that the stabilization  margin (the variable S in
equation {2})  is positive; a positive soutien implies that the stabilization  margin is
negative.
6 Although some analysts claim an additional benefit in that forward selling improves government budgeting
because it allows the government  to hedge its income from cocoa, this does not apply in Cote d'Ivoire
because the export tax is specific, not ad valorem. In principal, however, even with ad valorem export taxes,
the same benefit of forward sales is available to governments with liberalized agricultural sectors who have
the option of choosing to hedge their tax revenues. They can do this by selling futures forward, to the value
of the price exposure of their tax revenues, and then closing out the futures positions (buying back the
futures contracts) as taxes become receivable. The extent to which they should hedge will depend on the tax
take from the commodity export revenues, and the degree of progression  in export tax rates. Thus, the use of
futures markets provide similar benefits to forward sales for the government of Cote d'Ivoire to hedge its
cocoa export tax revenues if taxes become ad-valorem.
7The  electronic auction system  was introduced in May 1996; before that date, deblocages were allocated through
private negotiations between CAISTAB officials and exporters.7
Forward sales through the P VAM  are in essence  mandatory for private exporters
because deblocages are mandatory  for all exports. One argument for mandatory
forward sales is that their benefits cannot now be gained  by private agents because of
market failure. The reasoning  is as follows. Forward sellers  usually must put up the
crop, or some entitlement  to the crop such as a warehouse receipt, as collateral. In the
absence of a margin system, collateral  is required because sellers have an incentive  to
renege on the forward contract if prices subsequently  rise or if they cannot obtain the
quantity for delivery. The existence of performance  risk (i.e., the risk of non-delivery)
allows forward selling only if the seller has a good credit standing, if collateral is
adequate, or if margins are high enough. In the absence of physical inventories,
exporters will only be able to sell forward if they have a forward contract to buy from
producers. However, domestic forward markets do not exist due to performance  risk
and poor contract enforcement.  Performance  risk is higher where there are many small
growers, poorly functioning domestic financial institutions and weak legal contract
enforcement, all of which are characteristic of the Ivorian economy.  Difficulties in
reducing  performance therefore  makes forward selling difficult  by private agents and
justifies, in theory, some form of public action to reduce that risk.
The performance  risk in forward sales is indeed reduced by the intervention of
CAISTAB. CAISTAB,  by controlling exports through the sale of dcblocages,  can be
confident of the crop it will have for sale, and hence of the aggregate  performance
risk, in the coming season. Because of CAISTAB's established reputation in the
market as a reliable counterpart,  it is able to sell forward well of harvest, sometimes as
far as 18 months.
Evidence for this market failure is that forward sales of cocoa have declined,  in
volume and period of coverage, after liberalization. In Cameroon and Nigeria forward
sales have almost disappeared  and the few remaining  forward sales are for short
periods 8.
The  producer risk benefit offorward sales
Ivorian  cocoa producer prices have been fixed nominally  within seasons and hence
stabilization  has been successful in that sense (for example,  Diop-Boare 1994).  The
question  remains: are the benefits from stable, but lower, prices greater than those
from variable,  but higher, prices? One way to evaluate  the risk-return  trade-off to the
producer is the Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) approach, which is to calculate the
certainty equivalent (CE) producer price. The CE price is that guaranteed  price (as is
theoretically available for cocoa in Cote d'Ivoire)  at which risk-averse farmers would
be indifferent  compared to a variable market price.
The CE price is calculated  from
(3)  Pe  = P (exp  [-{s  +  0.5 R (E-1))  a}]),
8 Also, in coffee, where in almost all producing countries the private sector is solely in charge of marketing and
exports, forward sales are relatively low and cover no more than four to five months ahead.8
where PCC  is the real quarterly CE cocoa price, P is the average observed real world
price each quarter,  £ is the iso-elastic short-run  price elasticity of demand, a is the
coefficient of variation of real quarterly  world prices, and R is the relative risk
aversion coefficient. The variable P is first calculated on a CIF basis from world
market data (World Bank 1998)  and then converted to a farm gate basis by subtracting
maritime transport and direct domestic marketing  costs. In terms of Table 1, P would
then be 714 F/kg (i.e., the CIF price of 904 F/kg minus maritime transport of 75 F/kg
minus direct domestic marketing costs of 115 F/kg). We refer henceforth to P as the
"farm gate FOB price".
We note, first, that output is affected  by stabilization,  even though stabilization  is
within seasons,  given that there is some weak short-term supply response for tree
crops. Second, it is assumed that R is unity, indicating  that farmers are moderately  risk
averse (based on extensive empirical evidence launched by Binswanger, 1978).
Third, in the absence of price stabilization,  the volatility of domestic producer prices
would be that of international  cocoa prices. With those assumptions, we construct
counter-factuals in which intra-annual  producer price variability increases from zero
(perfect stabilization)  to world levels (perfect transmission  of international  prices) for
each season from 1993/94 through 1997/98.
The within season coefficient of variation of monthly world prices had a
maximum of 8.1 percent in 1993/94  and a minimum of 2.8 percent in 1994/95. The
absolute value of the short-run  price elasticity of demand is assumed to be 0.5.
Counter-factual  stabilization  benefits expressed relative to the P from equation (1)
would therefore have ranged from a maximum of 0.3 percent of P in 1993/94  to a
minimum of zero in 1994/95.  This range of benefits can be compared to the structure
of export  pricing from 1993/94 through 1997/98 expressed as a share of FOB:
producer price, 49 percent;  explicit export taxation, 22 percent; direct domestic
marketing  costs, 14 percent; CAISTAB's operating costs, 6 percent; and stabilization
profits, 10 percent. Assuming  for the moment that the average 22 percent of explicit
export taxation was justified, farmers  were further  taxed some 16 percent of the world
price (6 for CAISTAB costs and 10 for stabilization  profits) and received stabilization
benefits of less than 1 percent of world price. In the absence of stabilization,  but with
the same explicit export tax, farmers ought to have received a producer price at least
15 percent higher (in terms of the FOB price) or 125 F/kg in absolute terms.
The same result can be visualized over a longer period in Figure 3, which portrays
the observed real official producer  price of cocoa, the farm gate FOB price (_), and
the certainty  equivalent price (Pce)  by quarters from 1983 through 1997. The certainty
equivalent  price is close to P given that quarterly  prices vary little within crop
seasons. The CE price is generally  above the official minimum  before 1989.  A period
of exceptionally  low world prices occurred after 1989 and the CE price and the
minimum  were much closer then until 1993 or so when world prices rose again. In the
60 quarters observed from 1983  through 1997, in only nine did the producer price
exceed the CE price.9
Figure 3. Real quarterly  farm gate FOB, CE and
producer cocoa prices (1990 US$/mt)
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Source:  Authors'  calculations.
The income benefit offorward  sales
A second benefit claimed for forward sales is that they allow exporters a forward
premium. From the mid 1980s  through the mid 1990s,  the world market was in
relatively abundant supply. With stocks carried forward, forward prices have
generally  been higher than prices for spot or nearby  deliveries 9. This implies that
producing  countries could indeed receive higher prices by selling forward, i.e., the
existence of a positive premium.
The forward premium is not necessarily  positive, however. Futures prices may
indeed be either upward (downward)  biased, in that they might fall (rise) as maturity
approaches. Gilbert (1997) argues that, if short hedging (selling futures to hedge)
outweighs long hedging (buying futures to hedge), speculators will tend to be net long
(bought futures), and the futures price (of the same contract) must rise over time (as it
approaches expiration or delivery) to give a hedging profit. Where long hedging
dominates, speculators  will be net short and futures prices will fall towards maturity.
Gilbert (1997) analyzed  London cocoa market data from 1989 through 1996. He
found that the average November  price of the December futures contract was 5.2
percent lower than its February average, 4.7 percent lower than its May average and
3.3 percent lower than its August average. This suggests  an upward biased futures
price consistent with long hedging. 10  The comparable  figures for March were 4.4
percent higher in February,  3.3 percent higher in May and 2.3 percent higher in
9 The  forward  price  is  based  on the futures  price  for  the relevant  month  plus  or minus  a quality  premium.  Nearby
refers  to the closest  to delivery  futures  contract  which  may  mean  for  immediate  delivery  or for  delivery  in a
month  or two. For  practical  purposes,  a nearby  contract  is very  close  to being  a spot  contract.
'° However,  Gilbert  (1997)  notes  that  hedgers  have  usually  been  net short,  suggesting  that  speculators  have
consistently lost money in the cocoa market over this period.10
August. Because the mean differences between contract  prices were not statistically
significant,  Gilbert (1997, p.46) concluded that the argument that producing countries
gain in terms of higher export prices by selling forward should be judged as "not
proven".
We further compared different futures positions to spot with the same data. Table
2 shows that only the averages of the two most remote positions were significantly
different from spot. Figure 4 plots the difference  of the third, fourth, and fifth
positions against spot; if spot is December, then the third corresponds  to the
following  March. The three series are obviously closely related and the difference
between further and nearby positions can be either positive or negative. Based on this
analysis  and other studies, the evidence  for a statistically  significant forward premium
is at best inconclusive.
Table 2. Cocoa Price  Analysis of Variance
Position  Average  price  Average  difference
(£/mt)  from  spot  (percent)
Spot  834.2  0.0
Position  2  853.9  2.4
Position  3  858.1  2.9
Position  4  859.9  3.1
Position  5  877.5  5.2
Position  6  889.9*  6.7
Position  7  899.3**  7.8
Source: LIFFE monthly  data from December 1990 through May 1997.
*F-statistic  for n = 1,  76 significant  at IO  percent
** F-statistic  for n=  1,  76  significant  at 5 percentI1
Figure 4. Average Monthly Difference over Spot (L/mt)
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Sowrce:  Authors' calculations from LIFFE monthly data from December 1990 through May 1997.
Even if the forward price exceeds spot, the net benefits of forward sales may be
negative if there are significant  costs associated with selling forward. The net benefits
of forward sales of cocoa are determined by the relation  between the spot price and
forward prices, by storage costs including financing, and by the availability  of
physical cocoa for export. We present two models of forward sales (denoted by Ml
and M 2). The gross benefits of the first model are only due to regular sales, that is
selling forward evenly throughout the year, and not to the existence of the forward
premium. The second model, is to quantify  the income benefits (forward  premium)
that private exporters  might obtain by selling forward  in a liberalized  export system.
In the first model, CAISTAB sells forward through the PVAM. The net benefits of Ml
are the difference  between the average price realized by selling forward regularly and
the spot price, less the unit costs of operating the PVAM. In the model M, there is no
forward premium because CAISTAB does not hold the physical cocoa and there are
no physical storage costs.
In the second model, private exporters  buy physical cocoa and then choose
between selling immediately  at the spot price and selling forward at a price which
differs from spot by the amount of the forward premium. Because most physical cocoa
is available during the main harvest from mid-October  through February, we limit our
analysis of M2 to an exporter who has cocoa in December or March and can sell spot
at the December or March price or forward for future delivery. In model M2 there is a
forward premium  and its sign -- positive, negative,  or zero -- is an empirical  question.12
The net benefits of Ml are
H, = Pf  - P,  -C,
where Pfp  is the average PVAM price, P, is the average spot price, and C, is the unit
cost of the P VAM The benefits of the P VAM  over the average spot price derive from a
disciplined  strategy of forward sales and are unrelated  to the forward premium. The
net benefits are the gross benefits less the costs of operating the program and the
additional  maritime transport and direct domestic marketing costs incurred through
the bareme. In terms of Table 1, Pfl is the CIF price of 904 F/kg and C, corresponds  to
those of CAISTAB's operating costs that are directly  related to the PVAM 11.
The price Pf, could not be directly observed' 2 over many years but has been
calculated from a simulation study of the P VAM  (Marquet 1997) for 1979 through
1996. According  to the study, the average simulated  PVAM  price would have been 1.9
percent higher than the average spot CIF price of equivalent quality cocoa. We use
that figure to calculate  the gross benefits of public forward sales in M, (Table 3).
In estimating the net benefits of the PVAM we assume:
*  Cote d'Ivoire sells 1 million metric tons at an average CIF price of
US$1507 per metric ton; the latter price is roughly the average PVAMprice
for 1997/98;
*  The average P VAM  price is 1.9 percent higher than the spot CIF price (as
calculated from Marquet 1997);
*  The operating expenses of CAISTAB related to the PVAM are some US$
16.7 million (about 10 billion CFA francs at an average exchange rate of
600 CFAF/US$)' 3;
*  The "excess marketing costs" are estimated at 5 percent of the FOB price,
or some US$69 million; and
*  The producer  price is the 1997/98  minimum indicative price of 455F/kg
(US$758/mt).
" Some two-thirds of CAISTAB's average  operating costs of 49 CFAF/kg in Table I are for subsidies to industrial
processing of cocoa beans and to repayment  of debt to exporters accumulated during the price slump of the
1980s.
12 The price Pf, is the weighted average of contract prices, where the weights are quantities sold by CAISTAB  at
each position. It cannot be observed for previous seasons because CAISTAB has not always reported the
quantities sold by position.
3 Debt service is excluded. It could be argued that it should be included as the cost of past errors in judgment in
managing the forward sales program.13
Table 3. Net benefits of Ivorian public  forward sales (Model 1)
Calculation  of gross  benefits
Average  price  gain  (PVAM- spot)  1.9%
Quantity  exported  (mmt)  1,000
Average  CIF  PVAMprice  ($/mt)  1,507
Average  CIF  spot  price  ($/mt)  1,479
Average  FOB  price  ($/mt)  1,387
Total gross  benefits  (millions  of $)  28.1
Costs  of PVAM(millions  of $)
CAISTAB  operating  costs  16.7
Excess  marketing  costs  (5%  of FOB)  69.3
Net benefits  (millions  of $)  -57.9
Net benefits  as % of producer  income  -7.6%
Note:: Table may contain rounding errors.
Source: Marquet (1997), CAISTAB (1998) and authors' calculations.
The "excess marketing costs" are defined as the difference  between the levels
specified in the bareme and the levels that would be observed in competitive markets.
The excess arises out of the bareme negotiations  between CAISTAB  and exporters14
The regulated costs within the bareme are, as explained  previously, a necessary
feature of the P VAM because exporters cannot hedge their future domestic costs,
including the price at which they buy from farmers,  through market transactions;
hence, they must fix those costs through an administered price structure, such as the
bareme. In theory marketing costs within the bareme could be determined
competitively  and the excess would then be zero; in practice, they are fixed during
secret negotiations  between CAISTAB  officials and exporters. This price-fixing is
insulated from competition so that exporters' declared costs, and the profit margins
based on declared costs, are inflated. The inflated margins have two parts -- one is a
pure transfer from producers to exporters, and is not a social cost; the other is a social
cost that would be eliminated  through competitive  pricing. It is only the second part
that we define as "excess marketing costs".
Excess marketing costs are in fact likely to exceed 5 percent of FOB. Ivorian
marketing  costs appear to be at least double  those found in cocoa producing countries
with liberalized marketing systems,  where the sum of marketing costs is about 15
14 Cameroon prior to the 1994 reforms had a cocoa marketing system very similar to Cote d'Ivoire's based on the
concept of the Caisse de Stabilization. As in Cote d'lvoire the system  used the bareme to determine  the
producer price by deducting marketing costs and margins. The system also used forward sales aiming at
stabilizing producer prices. In Cameroon after market liberalization and the elimination  of the marketing
agency ONCPB, cocoa producer prices rose by 40-50 percent relatively  to those in Cote d'Ivoire. According
to Gilbert (1997), two thirds of this difference is due to reductions in Cameroonian marketing costs with the
reminder being due to lower taxation.14
percent or less of the FOB price 15. Many studies have observed high operating costs
of marketing  boards or public stabilization  funds compared to competitive systems
(e.g., Duncan and Jones (1993).
The relative net benefits of M 2 are:
172 =  (P2 /(1+  mC2)  - P2}/P 2
where Pj, is the forward price of M 2, m is the fraction of the year spent in storage,  P 2 is
the spot price for December/March  sales, and C2  is the cost of financing and physical
storage over the storage period, relative to P 12. The value of C2 is taken as 0.  13,
including an annual domestic rate of interest of 10 percent and 3 percent annual
physical storage costs. We note that C2  includes only private costs and does not
include the costs incurred in operating  the PVAM.
Table 4 reports returns to private forward sales. None of the mean net benefits is
significantly  different from zero at the 10 percent level. Hence, private agents  would
probably  not have had an incentive to sell forward unless there are risk benefits which
we have not attempted to quantify  here, or unless they had access to cheaper external
financing of their stocks.
Table 4. Relative net benefits ofprivate forward sales of cocoa
(in percentage of December and March spot price)  from 1989 - 1997
Position
2  3  4
Gross  benefit/spot  price  4.6  6.5  6.5
Relative  cost/spot  price  3.3  5.4  7.6
Net benefit/spot  price
Mean  1.3  1.0  -1.0
T-statistic  0.693  0.330  -0.255
III.  The Effects  of Tax and Marketing  Reforms
The government plans to eliminate the official  price and cost structure (the
bareme), public forward sales (the PVAM), and the stabilization  margin at the
beginning of the 1999/2000  season. It is considering a reduction in the explicit export
tax (DUS). As we have previously  analyzed  the PVAM, in this section, we discuss  the
likely effects of eliminating  the bareme and the stabilization  margin at different levels
of the DUS.
15  This was observed some time ago by Ruf and Milly (1990). Major cocoa producing that do not use marketing
agencies are Brazil, Cameroon (after the 1994 reforms),  the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Nigeria (after the 1986 reforms).15
The importance of cocoa in the Ivorian  economy  means that a partial equilibrium
analysis can be misleading  however. First, it excludes interactions  between cocoa and
other rural goods, and the industrial and service sectors. Second, the fiscal impact of
price and tax policy for cocoa is large because of its share in present government
income. In this section we investigate the economic  effects of cocoa taxation and
marketing  policy with a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model'6.
The model begins with a modified social accounting  matrix depicting the economy
at the end of 1996 (summarized  in Annex 1). In this model, an initial equilibrium
exists where household income equals consumption  plus savings plus net transfers;
the value added from labor, land and capital in goods production is equal to the
household endowments of those factors; exports equal imports plus net foreign
savings (aid) minus debt service; and government  revenue equals governnent
consumption  plus net foreign savings and net transfers to households minus debt
service.
Goods  production. There are 28 goods production sectors. Agricultural  sectors are
cocoa, coffee, forestry, food crops, other primary  products (including livestock,
fisheries,  other perennial exports). Goods are produced  by nested constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) functions. Ignoring taxes for the moment, for any goods sector,  Qi,
the production function is:
(4) Qi = [{16,Ltir  7V  +  5,'  L  v  +  K  v  + 5jnNi  v  v  ]  +  ±  G,,
The term in square brackets is the nest for value added from primary factors; L
indicates labor ('u'  for urban, 'r' for rural), K capital, N land, and V'  is a parameter
such that i  = I/ca  - 1 where a is the elasticity of substitution  among factors.  The term
Gi, is the aggregate  of intermediate  inputs into production and the elasticity of
17 substitution  between G and factors is zero
Land is used only in rural goods. Both rural and urban labor produce rural goods
because the value of agricultural output has two components. The first is on-farm
output produced with land and rural labor. The second is the additional value of
output between farm gate and FOB, which is produced  by urban labor and capital.
16 A similar model has been used by Chia et al (1992) to investigate  poverty issues in Cote d'Ivoire.
17  There are some differences between  the present model and that of Chia et al  (1992). In our model labor is not
differentiated by skill level; our model imposes a constant elasticity of substitution among factors equal to
0.5 in all rural goods (coffee,  cocoa, cotton, forestry, fisheries,  other agricultural exports, food crops) and to
0.8 in all urban goods (the 21 sectors of industry and services), while the corresponding elasticity varies
between 0.4 and 0.9 across sectors in Chia et al; our model is based on the 1995 input-output matrix of Cote
d'lvoire and 1996  national accounts data, while that of Chia et al uses 1986 data. Both models assume zero
substitution between primary factors and intermediate  goods.16
The treatment of taxes varies by the type of tax (Rutherford 1994). Indirect taxes
on intermediate goods are net (i.e., they raise producer cost), while trade taxes on
outputs are gross (i.e., they lower producer price). Equation (4) is modified to account
for taxes by
(4a) Qi(l _ rx ) =iVAf  +  EG,,(1  + rj
f  j
where VA is value added from primary factors, zc,  is indirect taxes on inputs and r'  is
the rate of export tax. Export taxes are paid only on coffee and cocoa and there are no
factor taxes.
Households. Five household classes supply primary factors, consume, save, invest,
and receive government  transfers. Classes are food crop producers (denoted as FC),
export crop producers (XC),  all other agricultural  producers (OA), urban formal (UP),
and urban informal (UN), defined by primary residence and source of income. For
simplicity we have excluded cash crops from the income sources of FC households.
This is admittedly unrealistic as all rural households have some cash crop income. But
the classification is respected if  one understands  that the FC households produce none
or very little of the major export tree crops (cocoa, coffee, rubber, oil palm, and
bananas). The 0A households  are a residual category  of specialized livestock
producers, fishermen, foresters, and rural artisans.
Households  supply four factors: rural labor (FC, XC, and OA), urban labor (UF
and UN), land, and capital. Food crop producers receive no income from export
crops, but export crop producers do receive some income from food crops; for
example, many farmers raise food crops on farms where the primary good is cocoa or
coffee.
Rural households. Rural households are about 56 percent of the population
(Annex 1 shows the distribution of households across classes). Smallholders  --
defined as related individuals living and working on owned or rented land with mainly
their own labor -- dominate  the rural sector. The plantation sector is confined to the
humid south, usually for production of oil palm and rubber. Those who are largely
food crop producers (the FC households) are some 24 percent of the population.
While they live throughout the country,  they are most characteristic  of the less humid
north. The climate of the North is less productive, in the sense of giving lower yields
of food crops and livestock and in forbidding  production of the more lucrative tree
crops. The FC households own 40 percent of value added (VA) from land and some
26 percent of VA from labor. Those who are mainly export producers are only 20
percent of the national population, but receive 45 percent of aggregate  VA from land.
The XC households have larger farm sizes (Benjamin and Deaton 1993:  p. 302) and,
by definition,  grow the highest-valued  crops. This class is a net importer of labor,
mainly from the other two rural classes.
The urban households are 45 percent of the population, of which 10 percent is in
the formal sector and 35 percent in the non-formal. Income is concentrated in the
formal, which takes 25 percent of all labor income, 60 percent of capital income and17
about 36 percent of aggregate  savings. Informal  households hold some 24 percent of
the capital stock, mainly in small-scale  services and manufacturing,  and take a little
more than one-half of aggregate labor income.
Household  income  Yh for class 'h'  is defined as Ef  Zjh  +  Vh, where Zjh is each
household's factor endowment  and Vh  is its net transfer from the government,  where
the latter two are as shown in Annex 1. Households  consume goods and services
through a nested CES consumption function. In the lower nest, households consume a
composite good, G',  of imports and domestic goods such that for any class of
households
(5)  G,a = [  m  (Qmh yo,  + pd(Qd)-I  1-1/. (5)  Gih ih  ~~~ih  ih
where p is the budget share, co  is the substitution  parameter equal to O.5,  Qdis a
domestic good and Q mis an  imported good. The composite good produces utility for
households from
(6)  Uh  = Zi 9 hi log(G,h)
where q hi is the class share in the national consumption  of a composite good. The
household budget constraint is
(7)  Zi (P*  Ga) = Yh - Sh  - Vh
where Pi is the price of the composite good.
Savings and investment. Domestic savings are the total of savings by export crop
producers and the urban classes. Food crop producers and other agricultural producers
do not save. Domestic savings is equal to new fixed investment net of (constant)
depreciation.  The savings investment balance is then  ZS  h  =  I. Net foreign savings,
SF, is X + A - M -D, assuming that there are no net unrequited  public or private
transfers' 8. The variable A is gross aid flows and D is gross debt service (principal
and interest). The government  rebates net foreign savings to consumers through a
lump sum transfer, shown in Annex 1 as "household  transfers". The value of I _ vi
iQi,, where v is the rate of new net investment.  Investrnent  is a fixed proportion of
output in the industry, service, and mining/petroleum  sectors and is zero in rural
goods.
18  The volume of net public transfers is in fact small.  That of net private transfers is large, but because private
transfers consist largely of unrecorded labor remittances,  its volume cannot be reliably included in the
model.18
Foreign trade. Imports are produced  with foreign  exchange. Imports and
domestic goods are transformed  into domestic supply  with CES functions. Exports are
produced with value added and intermediate  goods, as in equation (4). The allocation
of exportables among exports, domestic consumption  and government revenue
through export taxes is:
(8)  Qx  (1--,  ) = Xl +  G±  Gxh  +Y-Gx
where Qx is output of exportables  gross of export taxes,  Xi is net exports, Gxh  is
domestic consumption of exportables, Gx is the use of exportables as intermediate
inputs, and  zx is the export tax rate.
Government.  The government's income is indirect  taxes and foreign savings (the
trade surplus and aid). Its expenditure  is consumption  of goods and services and
foreign debt service. Any excess of income over expenditure  is rebated to households
so that the government's budget constraint is
(9) R+(A-D)-Cg  =Vh
where R indicates  revenue, A is aid, D is foreign debt service (principal  and interest),
Cg is government consumption,  and E Vh is the sum of govemment transfers to
households.  The variables R and Cg must be 2 0, while  A, D, and X  Vh  0; in the
h  h 
base data set, A > 0, D > 0  and  Y Vh  > 0 (Annex 1). Revenue is
h
(10) R = E(X,x  + G,mn + E Ga,-,a)
The tax rate on cocoa in equation (10) has two parts. The first is the explicit export
tax (the DUS). The second is the sum of the stabilization  margin and allocations  to
CAISTAB  reserves. This second part has two putative uses: ex-post producer price
stabilization,  and for marketing and other service costs. Because ex-post price
stabilization  is not paid and because CAISTAB's costs are neither competitively
determined  nor directly related to real services,  the stabilization margin amounts to a
second export tax" 9. The 1997/98  DUS was 18.1 percent of FOB and the implicit
export tax rate was 8.6 percent, giving a total taxation of 26.7 percent with respect to
FOB 20.
19 It may be objected that this revenue is in fact used to fund other government  services, but this does not change
the incidence of the cost with respect to coffee and cocoa producers; they are still taxed.
20 The 18.1 percent is that shown in Table 1; the 8.6 percent includes  the 7 percent for the stabilization  margin19
The optimal  partial equilibrium  export tax
Projected long-term Ivoirian exports of 1.0 mmt would give the country a share of
0.37 at projected world exports of 2.7 mmt. Given that market share, Cote d'Ivoire
can improve national income from cocoa by setting an export tax so that the domestic
producer price is the world price minus the export tax. With long-term values for the
rest of the world (ROW) supply elasticity of 1.0, ROW demand elasticity of  -0.6, and
a projected Ivorien world market share of 0.37, the absolute value of the elasticity of
demand facing Cote d'Ivoire (Trivedi and Akiyama, 1992) is
dc,i  = (edrow  - (1  -0.  3  7)  *.)/(03  7)  3.32.
implying an long-term export tax of 30.1 percent, which is close to the current total of
26.7 percent.
General Equilibrium Effects
Given that the current total export  tax from Cote d'Ivoire is reasonably close to the
long-term optimum, one expects national income to decline with large changes in the
current export tax. Hence, adjustments in the export tax would chiefly be
redistributive unless there are real cost reductions associated with other policy
changes.
Now we consider the general equilibrium  effects. Table 5 summarizes five
experiments involving the export tax and marketing  costs. In the first three
experiments,  the total cocoa export tax (including the explicit export tax and the
stabilization  margin) varies from 10 to 15 to 20 percent of FOB. A fourth experiment
holds the explicit cocoa tax at 17.5 percent (about  two-thirds of the current total rate)
and lowers direct domestic marketing costs by 5 percent. A fifth experiment lowers
marketing costs by 10 percent, with the explicit export tax held at 17.5 percent, which
is the ad-valorem equivalent of the DUS with respect to projected average world
prices. The fifth experiment  puts Ivorian marketing costs at a level similar to those of
competitive  systems.
With unchanged marketing  costs, the lower export taxes basically redistribute
income from urban to rural producers, as shown in experiments  (1), (2), and (3) in
Table 5. The redistributive effects work through the rise in rural wages induced by the
higher cocoa profitability associated with lower export taxation. At a cocoa export tax
of 10 percent (experiment 1), rural wages and land rents rise by between 18 and 20
percent. Those factor price shifts produce greater welfare changes among food crop
producers and other agricultural  producers than among export crop producers;  this
relative change is related to the sharp decline in coffee output associated with the rise
shown  in Table  1 and a part of the 6 percent of CAISTAB's  operating  costs.20
in cocoa production, since cocoa and coffee are to some extent competitors in
production.
We calculated an aggregate  welfare index for each experiment in which the
weights are the shares of each class in initial consumption.  The shares (from Annex 1)
are FC, .116; XC, .233; OA, 0.048; UF, 0.296; and UN, 0.307. Cutting the total export
tax from the current total of 26.7 percent of FOB reduces the aggregate  welfare index
by 1.9 percent. Eliminating  the implicit part of the export tax now levied through the
stabilization  fund and eliminating  the bareme so as to lower domestic marketing costs
makes the aggregate  welfare effect negligible and has a noticeable redistribiutive
effect in favor of the poorer rural groups. '
The government of Cote d'Ivoire receives about 13 percent of its annual revenue
from the cocoa DUS, so it is unlikely that it would drop that levy completely. A more
probable scenario is one in which it liberalizes export marketing and privatizes
CAISTAB, thereby cutting internal and external marketing costs  21 and eliminating  the
stabilization  margin. This scenario  is depicted in experiments (4) and (5) in Table 4,
which show lower marketing costs by 5 and 10 percent respectively at an export tax of
17.5 percent. The lower marketing  costs -- which consist partly of a transfer of rents
from export license holders and marketing  intermediaries  to land owners and laborers
who produce cocoa and partly of a real reduction in production costs -- allow
producers a higher share of FOB. At the same  DUS rate of 17.5 percent, lower
marketing costs also have a lower opportunity  cost in foregone coffee production, and
produce very little change in aggregate  welfare.
The CAISTAB system  is associated with a fixed rate for maritime transport, which makes most of the difference
between  the FOB and CIF prices. Hence, elimination of the fixed maritime transport rates in the bareme
ought to raise the Ivorian FOB price even if the world CIF price does not change at all. Changes in
marketing costs would benefit coffee as well.21
Table 5. Economic Effects of Changes in Export Tax and Marketing Costs of Cocoa
Experiment number  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Total export tax (percent)  10  15  20  17.5  17.5
(percentage changes from base)
Marketing costs  0  0  0  -5  -10
Value of output
Cocoa  27.8  19.8  11.5  17.1  18.5
Coffee  -28.6  -21.3  -12.9  -16.5  -15.8
Other agriculture  -5.1  -3.6  -2.1  -3.2  -3.5
Industrial goods  -9.7  -7.1  -4.1  -5.8  -6.1
Welfare index
Food producers  12.8  8.5  4.9  8.5  10.4
Export producers  5.7  4.1  2.4  4.4  5.6
Other rural producers  14.2  9.2  5.3  9.3  11.3
Urban formal  -8.0  -5.5  -3.0  -4.5  -4.8
Urban informal  -9.7  -6.5  -3.6  -5.4  -5.9
Weighted index  -1.9  -1.2  -0.6  -0.5  -0.2
Factor returns
Land rental  21.4  14.6  8.2  14.1  16.9
Rural wages  22.8  15.6  8.7  14.8  17.6
Urban wages  -2.8  -1.9  -1.0  -1.4  -1.4
Producer share of FOB  0.77  0.73  0.69  0.72  0.74
IV  Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the cocoa marketing  and pricing policies  in Cote d'Ivoire.
The paper looks into the cost of marketing, prices received by the farmers, and
examines the producer price stabilization  benefits.  The paper also analyzes the net
benefits from a publicly run system of export sales based on forward  selling and uses
a general equilibrium  model to show the effects of reductions  in export taxes and
marketing  costs.  Based on the analysis performed,  the following  are some of the key
conclusions.
First, we conclude  unambiguously  that cocoa price  and marketing policy have
reduced  farmers' mean income for many years and continue to do so. The share of the
Ivorien producer price to the FOB price and the absolute  level of producer prices are
the lowest among  cocoa producers worldwide.  The adjustment  of producer prices with
respect to the world price has not compensated growers in bad years for what they
have lost in good years. In other words, the state has not used or managed the
stabilization  fund as it was intended.22
Much of the debate about stabilization  hinges on whether farmers make the right
choices about income fluctuations  caused by exogenous price movements. The
evidence, while far from complete, indicates  that farmers use windfall gains
rationally 22. It is not necessarily true, therefore, that in the absence of government
stabilization  programs farmers will overspend, either on current consumption or on
overinvestment  in new plantings in response to temporarily high prices, as long as
there are alternative  economic activities.
The fixed intra-annual  price provides comparatively  little benefit to producers
because it deals with the wrong source of variation.  Most of the price variance is
between years, not within years. Therefore,  the annual minimum price can be
eliminated, as its main function now is to create opportunities  for corruption  through
harassment of traders and farmers during official attempts  to enforce the minimum
price.
Second, price and marketing  policies have reduced farmers' mean incomes
without compensating  them adequately  in terms of lower price risk. In other words,
the government  has stabilized farm revenues from cocoa only at a high cost in mean
income.
Third, the costs of the public forward sales system (PTAM)  outweigh its benefits.
Proponents of the forward sales claim that it benefits producers because it allows a
stable producer  price and because forward prices are higher than spot. We find that
mean producer prices under the P VAM  do not compensate  for the lower price risk.
The argument that Cote d'Ivoire gains higher prices by selling forward is found
inconclusive,  but the net benefits are conclusively  negative.
Fourth, the farm price should and can be raised. There are two ways to do so: by
lowering the export tax or by allowing competition  to impose greater efficiency  in
marketing.  Lowering the cocoa export tax would reduce national income slightly,
however. Cote d'Ivoire has enough monopoly power in the world market that the
income maximizing export tax is about 30 percent even taking into account general
equilibrium effects.
Fifth, lowering  the explicit export tax (the DUS) from current levels would have a
small negative effect on national income. While the current explicit export tax of 17-
18 percent is well below the short-term  optimal rate, raising the explicit export tax
closer to the optimal rate would provoke a supply response from the other producers
and eventually  reduce Ivorian market share.
Sixth, lowering  the cocoa export tax would improve the national income
distribution. The improvement depends on the weights assigned to different household
22 Hill (1963) argues that Ghanaian cocoa farmers are quite careful regarding wasteful consumption expenditures.
Bevan, Collier and Gunning (1992), suggest  that Kenyan coffee farmers understood the temporary nature of
the coffee price boom in the late 1970s and saved about 60 percent of their extra income. Bauer (1984) finds
that farmers in periods of booms diversify into other activities.23
incomes. Because rural poverty is more severe  than urban, weighted incomes at lower
export tax rates would probably  be welfare improving.
Seventh,  raising the minimum  producer price by making domestic marketing
cheaper through more aggressive  reforms would raise national income at a given
export tax. Total Ivorian marketing  costs -- including the indirect costs incurred by the
operations of CAISTAB -- are high compared to other cocoa producing countries.
Greater  marketing efficiency can be achieved  by eliminating  the bareme and would
not have the indirect fiscal effect of raising taxes in other sectors.
We note an important indirect effect of a lower implicit export tax. This is the
benefit to rural groups that do not produce cocoa. A cut in the export taxation of cocoa
improves  rural wages and hence benefits rural producers of food crops and other
exports. Given the difficulties  in achieving  this desirable result by other means, this is
not a trivial benefit.
There is another effect of the domestic pricing system which cannot be quantified,
but which merits some comment. The bareme and the minimum producer price, by
imposing uniform costs throughout  the domestic and foreign  marketing chains, make
price discovery  and cooperative  marketing  by producers unprofitable.  In so doing,
they prevent the emergence  of powerful producers' organizations  capable of
representing  the interests of small Ivorien farmers and maintain those farmers in a
perpetual state of dependence  on the government  and on the powerful and well-
organized private exporters.24
Annex  1. Supply and Demand  Matrix for  Cote d'Ivoire  in 1996 (billions  of CFA francs)
Goods sectors (Q)  Factor endowments [ZtaJ
Coffee Cocoa  Forest  Other  Other  Industry  Services  Minerals  Land  R. Labor  U. Labor  Capital  Savings  Transfers
Agric  Exports  [Sh]  received(Vh)
Output (Q)  19.4  53.5  100.7  985.5  280.8  1795.0  2865.5  107.1
Value added from primary factors [VAf]
Land [N]  67.2  266.4  19.3  594.3  112.2
Rural labor IL,]  22.4  132.2  16.4  231.1  84.3
Urban labor [L,]  5.8  28.6  0.1  6.3  3.9  204.6  870.6  30.4
Capital [KI  20.6  101.4  0.5  22.2  13.7  547.3  1018.2  56.6
Intermediate  goods use [G]  89.2  309.9  82.1  147.1  136.2  1854.3  751.0  26.0
Taxes on intermediate  goods [g]  0  0  8.3  -12.9  2.0  237.7  381.8  0.6
HOUSEHOLDS  (pop. 14.23 million)
Consumption  [C]
Food crop (3.4 million) [FC]  197.2  13.9  178.8  101.0  423.7  126.5  0.0  -58.0
Export  crop (2.9 million) [XC]  379.5  21.9  388.4  197.6  476.7  277.2  284.9  124.7  75.0
Other agricultural (1.6 million) [OA]  79.5  5.6  77.2  40.8  158.9  82.7  0.0  -38.0
Urban formal (1.4 million) [UF]  126.1  8.5  568.0  547.2  287.6  1068.2  159.3  59.4
Urban informal (5.0 million) [UN]  243.3  21.2  662.2  364.8  862.7  427.3  154.8  165.3
Investment [hI]  10.1  120.5  308.1
GOVERNMENT
Tax revenue [R]
Export taxes (rt)  2.6  285.9
Import taxes (r)  0.1  18.7  0.3  382.93
Consumption [Cg]  70.2  517.5
Transfers  to households [IV]
Gross extemal debt service [D]
Aid [A]
FOREIGN  TRADE
Exports [XI  185.9  784.9  26.0  2.4  71.5  1048.9  156.0  6.5
Imports [MI  0.4  187.2  0.0  1260.9  600.0  4.4
Source: Republique  de la Cote  d'lvoire  (1997).25
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